Kaydet (Commit) ccd048fa authored tarafından Caolán McNamara's avatar Caolán McNamara

bump to openssl-1.0.1g

Change-Id: I1e0ee6aa3d136c75309c5c70011da787806efa1f
üst a3416803
......@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ export MYTHES_TARBALL := 46e92b68e31e858512b680b3b61dc4c1-mythes-1.2.3.tar.gz
export NEON_TARBALL := ff369e69ef0f0143beb5626164e87ae2-neon-0.29.5.tar.gz
export NSS_TARBALL := 06beb053e257d9e22641339c905c6eba-nss-3.15.3-with-nspr-4.10.2.tar.gz
export OPENLDAP_TARBALL := 804c6cb5698db30b75ad0ff1c25baefd-openldap-2.4.31.tgz
export OPENSSL_TARBALL := 66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c-openssl-1.0.1e.tar.gz
export OPENSSL_TARBALL := de62b43dfcd858e66a74bee1c834e959-openssl-1.0.1g.tar.gz
export ORCUS_TARBALL := 7681383be6ce489d84c1c74f4e7f9643-liborcus-0.7.0.tar.bz2
export PIXMAN_TARBALL := c63f411b3ad147db2bcce1bf262a0e02-pixman-0.24.4.tar.bz2
export PNG_TARBALL := 9e5d864bce8f06751bbd99962ecf4aad-libpng-1.5.10.tar.gz
......
From: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Date: Sat, 5 Apr 2014 23:51:06 +0000 (+0100)
Subject: Add heartbeat extension bounds check.
X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_0_1g~3
X-Git-Url: http://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=96db902
Add heartbeat extension bounds check.
A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.
Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
---
diff --git a/a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index 7a5596a..2e8cf68 100644
--- a/a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ a/b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -1459,26 +1459,36 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- pl = p;
-
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ /* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
+ hbtype = *p++;
+ n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+ pl = p;
+
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
{
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
+ unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
+ 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
+ payload + padding;
int r;
+ if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ return 0;
+
/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
* message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
* payload, plus padding
*/
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
+ buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
@@ -1489,11 +1499,11 @@ dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
/* Random padding */
RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
- r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
+ r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
- buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
+ buffer, write_length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index b82fada..bddffd9 100644
--- a/a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ a/b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -2588,16 +2588,20 @@ tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- pl = p;
-
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ /* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
+ hbtype = *p++;
+ n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+ pl = p;
+
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
{
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
......@@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ $(eval $(call gb_UnpackedTarball_fix_end_of_line,openssl,\
))
$(eval $(call gb_UnpackedTarball_add_patches,openssl,\
external/openssl/CVE-2014-0160.patch \
$(if $(filter LINUX FREEBSD ANDROID,$(OS)),external/openssl/openssllnx.patch) \
$(if $(filter WNTGCC,$(OS)$(COM)),external/openssl/opensslmingw.patch) \
$(if $(filter MSC,$(COM)),external/openssl/opensslwnt.patch) \
......
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