Kaydet (Commit) 53ff0969 authored tarafından Simon Charette's avatar Simon Charette Kaydeden (comit) Tim Graham

Prevented data leakage in contrib.admin via query string manipulation.

This is a security fix. Disclosure following shortly.
üst 5307ce56
......@@ -4,3 +4,8 @@ from django.core.exceptions import SuspiciousOperation
class DisallowedModelAdminLookup(SuspiciousOperation):
"""Invalid filter was passed to admin view via URL querystring"""
pass
class DisallowedModelAdminToField(SuspiciousOperation):
"""Invalid to_field was passed to admin view via URL query string"""
pass
......@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from django.contrib.admin import widgets, helpers
from django.contrib.admin import validation
from django.contrib.admin.checks import (BaseModelAdminChecks, ModelAdminChecks,
InlineModelAdminChecks)
from django.contrib.admin.exceptions import DisallowedModelAdminToField
from django.contrib.admin.utils import (quote, unquote, flatten_fieldsets,
get_deleted_objects, model_format_dict, NestedObjects,
lookup_needs_distinct)
......@@ -434,6 +435,24 @@ class BaseModelAdmin(six.with_metaclass(forms.MediaDefiningClass)):
valid_lookups.append(filter_item)
return clean_lookup in valid_lookups
def to_field_allowed(self, request, to_field):
opts = self.model._meta
try:
field = opts.get_field(to_field)
except FieldDoesNotExist:
return False
# Make sure at least one of the models registered for this site
# references this field.
registered_models = self.admin_site._registry
for related_object in opts.get_all_related_objects():
if (related_object.model in registered_models and
field in related_object.field.foreign_related_fields):
return True
return False
def has_add_permission(self, request):
"""
Returns True if the given request has permission to add an object.
......@@ -1337,6 +1356,10 @@ class ModelAdmin(BaseModelAdmin):
@transaction.atomic
def changeform_view(self, request, object_id=None, form_url='', extra_context=None):
to_field = request.POST.get(TO_FIELD_VAR, request.GET.get(TO_FIELD_VAR))
if to_field and not self.to_field_allowed(request, to_field):
raise DisallowedModelAdminToField("The field %s cannot be referenced." % to_field)
model = self.model
opts = model._meta
add = object_id is None
......@@ -1409,8 +1432,7 @@ class ModelAdmin(BaseModelAdmin):
original=obj,
is_popup=(IS_POPUP_VAR in request.POST or
IS_POPUP_VAR in request.GET),
to_field=request.POST.get(TO_FIELD_VAR,
request.GET.get(TO_FIELD_VAR)),
to_field=to_field,
media=media,
inline_admin_formsets=inline_formsets,
errors=helpers.AdminErrorList(form, formsets),
......
......@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ from django.utils.translation import ugettext, ugettext_lazy
from django.utils.http import urlencode
from django.contrib.admin import FieldListFilter
from django.contrib.admin.exceptions import DisallowedModelAdminLookup
from django.contrib.admin.exceptions import (
DisallowedModelAdminLookup, DisallowedModelAdminToField,
)
from django.contrib.admin.options import IncorrectLookupParameters, IS_POPUP_VAR, TO_FIELD_VAR
from django.contrib.admin.utils import (quote, get_fields_from_path,
lookup_needs_distinct, prepare_lookup_value)
......@@ -58,7 +60,10 @@ class ChangeList(object):
self.page_num = 0
self.show_all = ALL_VAR in request.GET
self.is_popup = IS_POPUP_VAR in request.GET
self.to_field = request.GET.get(TO_FIELD_VAR)
to_field = request.GET.get(TO_FIELD_VAR)
if to_field and not model_admin.to_field_allowed(request, to_field):
raise DisallowedModelAdminToField("The field %s cannot be referenced." % to_field)
self.to_field = to_field
self.params = dict(request.GET.items())
if PAGE_VAR in self.params:
del self.params[PAGE_VAR]
......
......@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ SuspiciousOperation
* DisallowedHost
* DisallowedModelAdminLookup
* DisallowedModelAdminToField
* DisallowedRedirect
* InvalidSessionKey
* SuspiciousFileOperation
......
......@@ -47,3 +47,18 @@ and the ``RemoteUserBackend``, a change to the ``REMOTE_USER`` header between
requests without an intervening logout could result in the prior user's session
being co-opted by the subsequent user. The middleware now logs the user out on
a failed login attempt.
Data leakage via query string manipulation in ``contrib.admin``
===============================================================
In older versions of Django it was possible to reveal any field's data by
modifying the "popup" and "to_field" parameters of the query string on an admin
change form page. For example, requesting a URL like
``/admin/auth/user/?pop=1&t=password`` and viewing the page's HTML allowed
viewing the password hash of each user. While the admin requires users to have
permissions to view the change form pages in the first place, this could leak
data if you rely on users having access to view only certain fields on a model.
To address the issue, an exception will now be raised if a ``to_field`` value
that isn't a related field to a model that has been registered with the admin
is specified.
......@@ -47,3 +47,18 @@ and the ``RemoteUserBackend``, a change to the ``REMOTE_USER`` header between
requests without an intervening logout could result in the prior user's session
being co-opted by the subsequent user. The middleware now logs the user out on
a failed login attempt.
Data leakage via query string manipulation in ``contrib.admin``
===============================================================
In older versions of Django it was possible to reveal any field's data by
modifying the "popup" and "to_field" parameters of the query string on an admin
change form page. For example, requesting a URL like
``/admin/auth/user/?pop=1&t=password`` and viewing the page's HTML allowed
viewing the password hash of each user. While the admin requires users to have
permissions to view the change form pages in the first place, this could leak
data if you rely on users having access to view only certain fields on a model.
To address the issue, an exception will now be raised if a ``to_field`` value
that isn't a related field to a model that has been registered with the admin
is specified.
......@@ -48,6 +48,21 @@ requests without an intervening logout could result in the prior user's session
being co-opted by the subsequent user. The middleware now logs the user out on
a failed login attempt.
Data leakage via query string manipulation in ``contrib.admin``
===============================================================
In older versions of Django it was possible to reveal any field's data by
modifying the "popup" and "to_field" parameters of the query string on an admin
change form page. For example, requesting a URL like
``/admin/auth/user/?_popup=1&t=password`` and viewing the page's HTML allowed
viewing the password hash of each user. While the admin requires users to have
permissions to view the change form pages in the first place, this could leak
data if you rely on users having access to view only certain fields on a model.
To address the issue, an exception will now be raised if a ``to_field`` value
that isn't a related field to a model that has been registered with the admin
is specified.
Bugfixes
========
......
......@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ from django.contrib.auth import get_permission_codename
from django.contrib.admin import ModelAdmin
from django.contrib.admin.helpers import ACTION_CHECKBOX_NAME
from django.contrib.admin.models import LogEntry, DELETION
from django.contrib.admin.options import TO_FIELD_VAR
from django.contrib.admin.templatetags.admin_static import static
from django.contrib.admin.templatetags.admin_urls import add_preserved_filters
from django.contrib.admin.tests import AdminSeleniumWebDriverTestCase
......@@ -598,6 +599,36 @@ class AdminViewBasicTest(AdminViewBasicTestCase):
response = self.client.get("/test_admin/admin/admin_views/workhour/?employee__person_ptr__exact=%d" % e1.pk)
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
def test_disallowed_to_field(self):
with patch_logger('django.security.DisallowedModelAdminToField', 'error') as calls:
response = self.client.get("/test_admin/admin/admin_views/section/", {TO_FIELD_VAR: 'missing_field'})
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 400)
self.assertEqual(len(calls), 1)
# Specifying a field that is not refered by any other model registered
# to this admin site should raise an exception.
with patch_logger('django.security.DisallowedModelAdminToField', 'error') as calls:
response = self.client.get("/test_admin/admin/admin_views/section/", {TO_FIELD_VAR: 'name'})
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 400)
self.assertEqual(len(calls), 1)
# Specifying a field referenced by another model should be allowed.
response = self.client.get("/test_admin/admin/admin_views/section/", {TO_FIELD_VAR: 'id'})
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
# We also want to prevent the add and change view from leaking a
# disallowed field value.
with patch_logger('django.security.DisallowedModelAdminToField', 'error') as calls:
response = self.client.post("/test_admin/admin/admin_views/section/add/", {TO_FIELD_VAR: 'name'})
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 400)
self.assertEqual(len(calls), 1)
section = Section.objects.create()
with patch_logger('django.security.DisallowedModelAdminToField', 'error') as calls:
response = self.client.post("/test_admin/admin/admin_views/section/%d/" % section.pk, {TO_FIELD_VAR: 'name'})
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 400)
self.assertEqual(len(calls), 1)
def test_allowed_filtering_15103(self):
"""
Regressions test for ticket 15103 - filtering on fields defined in a
......@@ -2378,10 +2409,9 @@ class AdminSearchTest(TestCase):
"""Ensure that the to_field GET parameter is preserved when a search
is performed. Refs #10918.
"""
from django.contrib.admin.views.main import TO_FIELD_VAR
response = self.client.get('/test_admin/admin/auth/user/?q=joe&%s=username' % TO_FIELD_VAR)
response = self.client.get('/test_admin/admin/auth/user/?q=joe&%s=id' % TO_FIELD_VAR)
self.assertContains(response, "\n1 user\n")
self.assertContains(response, '<input type="hidden" name="_to_field" value="username"/>', html=True)
self.assertContains(response, '<input type="hidden" name="%s" value="id"/>' % TO_FIELD_VAR, html=True)
def test_exact_matches(self):
response = self.client.get('/test_admin/admin/admin_views/recommendation/?q=bar')
......
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